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INTHE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IRA ROYAL L. TRIBE, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-
TION, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
AND RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to 
determine constitutionality of the Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 11-
19-1 et seq (1973), and of actions taken and proposed 
to be taken by the Defendants and Respondents pur-
suant to such act and to determine the proper interpre-
tation of certain provisions of such act. 
Case No. 
13856 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, was pre-
sented documentary and testimonial evidence and 
entered declaratory judgment as prayed in the counter-
claim of Defendants and Respondents holding that the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "The Act") is constitutional and that cer-
tain resolutions of certain of the Defendants are lawful 
and valid, including resolutions approving a plan for 
the issuance of bonds by the Salt Lake City Redevelop-
ment Agency ("Redevelopment Agency or Agency") 
for the payment of which certain parking revenues and 
"tax increments" are pledged. (R. 98-100). 
R E L I E F S O U G H T BY A P P E L L A N T S 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the 
trial court and a declaration that the Act and the activi-
ties undertaken and proposed by the Respondents pur-
suant thereto are violative of both state and federal law. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Respondents concur with the Appellants' state-
ment of facts but supplement and amplify them with 
the following: 
The project area in which the proposed parking 
facility is situated, was in a deteriorating blighted con-
dition when it was selected for improvement under the 
Redevelopment Agency plan. (R. 127, Exhibits 7 and 
8). The area required significantly more expenditure of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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city funds than were generated by taxes assessed and lev-
ied upon the real property in the area. (R. 152,180). Al-
most all of the buildings were non-inhabitable above the 
ground floor (R. 127, 172) and the assessed valuation 
decreased steadily from 1969 to 1973 during a period 
of spiraling inflation (Exhibit 18 found at R. 87). 
Were it not for the action taken and proposed to be 
taken by the Respondents, the area was and is doomed 
to further deterioration with the resulting adverse eco-
nomic impact upon the City and its taxpayers. (R. 180-
181). The blighted neighborhood with its attendant 
crime, health and economic problems could not attract 
suitable development by private industry without area-
wide rehabilitation and the construction of needed park-
ing facilities. (R. 172-173 and Exhibit 4) . Implemen-
tation of all aspects of the proposed plan will increase 
assessed valuations by an estimated 6.4 to 9.8 million 
dollars by reason of market values of improvements 
ranging from an estimated 32 million dollars to approxi-
mately 49 million dollars. (Exhibit 13). All of this 
increase will be accomplished without cost to the City, 
Salt Lake County, or the State of Utah. Sales tax 
revenues collected by the state will be increased dra-
matically. Existing facilities such as the civic center 
may be used more efficiently and other development by 
private businesses in the state will be facilitated. The 
state tourism industry will benefit from the convenience 
of available parking near major tourist attractions and 
more and bigger conventions can be scheduled with the 
availability of the facilities to be developed within the 
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project area. Thus the parking structure to be financed 
with the tax allocation and parking revenue bond issue 
will have an economic multiplier effect with statewide 
impact. (R. 151-152). (Concerning the matters generally 
set out in this paragraph, see also paragraphs 9 and 10 
of the Findings of Fact of the trial court, R. 93-94.) 
Revenues from the tax increment portion of the 
assessed valuation increase may be allocated for use by 
the Redevelopment Agency only until such time as the 
loans, advances and indebtedness or any interest there-
on incurred by the Agency have been paid. Pursuant 
to Section 11-19-25 (1) (b), all monies thereafter received 
from taxes upon the taxable property in the redevelop-
ment project shall be paid into the funds of the respec-
tive taxing agencies in the same manner as taxes on all 
other property. (See also R. 169). Thus the proposed 
plan and the underlying enabling legislation contem-
plate a source of increased tax revenue for taxing enti-
ties such as the state, county, school districts, and city. 
But these entities will not be required to contribute to 
the cost of improving the project area in accordance 
with the redevelopment plan. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE CREATION AND OPERATION 
OF THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY UN-
DER THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DE-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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VELOPMENT ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHICH PROHIBITS DEL-
EGATION TO A SPECIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE POWER TO MAKE, SUPERVISE 
OR INTERFERE WITH A MUNICIPAL IM-
PROVEMENT OR TO PERFORM MUNICH 
AL FUNCTIONS. 
The intended purpose of the Section 28 constitu-
tional provision (commonly referred to as the "Ripper 
Clause") is to preclude the improper imposition of state 
legislative directives on municipalities. See Porter, 
"Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law: An Early 
Urban Experiment," Utah Law Review, (Part I ) 
April, 1969 page 287 and (Part I I ) June, 1969 page 
450. These problems as well as the express constitutional 
prohibition are avoided by the proposed redevelopment 
plan. 
A. There is no Legislative Delegation to the Re-
development Agency Because the Agency was Volun-
tarily Created by the City. 
The Redevelopment Agency was created by an 
ordinance adopted by the Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City—not by a state legislative enactment. 
The Utah Neighborhood Development Act leaves the 
formation of a redevelopment agency and the implemen-
tation of any redevelopment plans entirely to the discre-
tion of the legislative bodies of communities. By allow-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ing the cities to elect whether or not to take advantage 
of the state legislation allowing the creation of rede-
velopment agencies, the legislature has anticipated the 
local control of such agencies and it has avoided inter-
ference with the self-control by municipalities of muni-
cipal functions. 
This pirnciple was recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court in a decision in which Justice Crockett, in speak-
ing for a unanimous court, rejected the argument pro-
pounded on behalf of the State Water Pollution Con-
trol Board that its interference with municipal func-
tions was analogous to that of a metropolitan water 
district. The court pointed out the "cases are clearly 
distinguishable in that the Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict was initiated by the cities desiring the district and 
there was no direct delegation by the legislature to a 
board or agency which would allow it to interfere with 
any municipal improvement, property, or function". 
State Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 
2d 247, 311 P.2d 370, 376 (1957). 
We acknowledge the consistency of this court in 
striking down legislation under which authority has 
been delegated to state agencies to perform or interfere 
directly with municipal functions. But local option leg-
islation avoids this problem. In three of the five cases 
cited on page 14 of Appellants' brief, this court ap-
proved statutes allowing local electors to create public 
entities for the creation of a metropolitan water district, 
Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935); 
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a sewer and water district Tygesen v. Magna Water 
Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950); and a special 
service district for construction of a swimming pool, 
Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, 23 
Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814 (1969). The remaining cases 
are not in point because they were decided on grounds 
other than improper delegation. Dictum in Backman v. 
Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412,375 P.2d 756 (1962) 
discusses the delegation issue and refers to what is now 
Article VI, Section 28 of the Constitution, but that 
case turned on the failure of Salt Lake County to ini-
tiate a bond election at the time and in the manner called 
for under the Act. In a subsequent case this court ex-
pressly refused to follow the dictum of the Backman 
case and the majority opinions limited the Backman 
holding to the bond election issue. Branch v. Salt Lake 
County Service Area No. 2, supra. The majority opin-
ions in the Branch case also caution against an unduly 
broad interpretation of Carter v. Beaver County Service 
Area No. 1,16 Utah 280, 399 P.2d 440 (1965), in which 
the objectionable features of the County Service Area 
Act were its vagueness and the attempted authorization 
of "an unlimited number of activities". Since the Carter 
and Backman cases were decided for reasons other than 
the local option issue, it was apparent to the trial court 
that the position of this court as stated in State 
Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, supra, re-
mains unchanged so that there is not an unconstitutional 
legislative delegation where enabling statutes cannot be 
implemented without affirmative action of local entities. 
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Well reasoned opinions from neighboring jurisdic-
tions have also found lack of delegation where local 
option is granted. The California Supreme Court in 
City of Whittier v. Dickson, 24 Cal.2d 665, 151 P.2d 
5 (1944) rejected a challenge that creation of a park-
ing district pursuant to state statutory authorization 
violated a California constitutional provision prohibiting 
the delegation of any municipal function to a special 
commission. In so holding the court noted, "The park-
ing place commissioners, however, are city officers ap-
pointed by the legislative body of the city when it elects 
to acquire parking places under the act, and are re-
movable at the pleasure of that body. I t is the local gov-
erning body and not the Legislature that confers upon 
the commission the right to exercise its functions." (151 
P.2d at 7). In a similar case the Colorado Supreme 
Court found absence of imposition of legislative fiat 
upon the populace affected and compliance to the full-
est extent with the principles of local self-government 
in the creation of a sanitation district by local electors 
pursuant to enabling legislation. City of Aurora v. 
Aurora Sanitation District, 122 Col. 407, 149 P.2d 662 
(1944). See also Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14 
Cal.2d 37, 94 P.2d 794 (1939). 
Pennsylvania, which provided the constitutional 
model for Utah and other states by being the first to 
amend its constitution to include the so-called "Ripper 
Clause" has a constitutional provision substantially 
identical to Article VI, Section 28. In Belovsky v. Re-
development Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 
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(1947) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved an 
urban development authority because final decisions 
about the scope and substance of redevelopment proj-
ects were reserved to local elected officers. The earlier 
Pennsylvania case of Lighton v. Abington Township, 
336 Pa. 345, 9 A.2d 609 (1939), can be distinguished 
from the Belovsky case because Lighton dealt with a 
delegation of municipal authority to a private corpora-
tion, an act which was repugnant to both state and mu-
nicipal law. I t is apparent that Pennsylvania is in ac-
cord with the California and Colorado Supreme Courts. 
B. There is no Unconstitutional Legislative Dele-
gation Because Members of the Board of Commission-
ers of the City are the only Members of the Board of 
Commissioners of the Redevelopment Agency. 
The Utah Legislature also reserved to municipali-
ties control over their redevelopment agencies by pro-
viding that if one were formed pursuant to the exercise 
of local option, the legislative body of the community 
would designate itself as the legislative body of the 
agency. I t is obvious that there can be no delegation of 
municipal administrative authority by the legislature 
through the city to a redevelopment agency where both 
the agency and the city are managed by the same muni-
cipal legislative body. I t is equally clear that the possible 
evils complained of in the Backman case, supra; i.e., 
legislative interference with municipal functions, dimi-
nution of local self-control and the imposition of an in-
termediate level of non-representative government, are 
entirely avoided where the Board of Commissioners of 
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the City also administers the Agency. If the practices 
and policies of the Board of Commissioners of the Re-
development Agency are unsatisfactory to the city elec-
torate, new commissioners will be elected to replace the 
incumbents, 
C. The Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
is Not A Special Commission, Private Corporation or 
Association Improperly Managing, Supervising or In-
terfering With Any Municipal Improvement or Per-
forming any Municipal Functions Within the Meaning 
of Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution. 
Although the Redevelopment Agency is admin-
istered and managed by the legislative body of Salt 
Lake City, its operations are separate and distinguish-
able from those of the City. One of the Appellants' al-
ternative arguments is that operational differences and 
separateness establish the Redevelopment Agency as a 
special commission. The existence of a legal entity sepa-
rate from that of a municipality is not by itself deter-
minitive of the status of "special commission", nor is it 
illegal under the proper circumstances for that separate 
legal entity to perform certain functions which cities 
are empowered to perform. See for example, Branch v. 
Salt Lake City Service Area No. 2, supra, where this 
court approved the creation of a special service area for 
purposes including the construction of a swimming pool 
in an area where similar facilities were not available 
despite the inherent authority of the county to construct 
a swimming pool; Barlow v. Clearfield City Corp., 1 
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Utah 2d 419, 268 P.2d 682 (1954) wherein a city was 
not prohibited from contracting with a separate entity, 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, for services 
which the city was empowered to perform itself; and 
Lehi City v. Meiling, supra, in which the validity of a 
separate water district was upheld even though the City 
of Lehi and other cities in the district had authority to 
establish, operate and maintain a water system. Clearly 
the holding of this court in the Lehi City case, supra, 
that a water district does not come within the constitu-
tional designation "special commission, private corpora-
tion or association" (48 P.2d at 535), also applies to 
the Redevelopment Agency which is merely a "public 
agency or entity created for beneficial and necessary 
public purposes". (48 P.2d at 541). See also Freeman v. 
Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P.2d 174 (1954); and 
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 
Utah 55,145 P.2d 503 (1944). 
I t is acknowledged that the holdings of the above 
cited cases do not justify a position that any separate 
commission may be empowered to perform municipal 
functions. But in the case at bar there is a total absence 
of any objectionable impingement upon municipal con-
trol and functions. The Redevelopment Agency cannot 
impose or levy a tax nor can it interfere with the ad-
ministration of the internal affairs of the City. The 
allocation of tax increment revenues does not affect the 
mill levy imposed by taxing units. The City maintains 
absolute control of the Agency through its Board of 
Commissioners and coordination of the separate func-
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tions of the two entities can be maintained effectively. 
The City will continue to possess and exercise every 
municipal function it now has. The Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act contemplates cooperation between 
cities and their redevelopment agencies—not interfer-
ence with municipal functions. 
Appellants contend the interruption of street 
traffic flow which may be experienced during the con-
struction phase of the proposed Redevelopment Agency 
plan constitutes interference with the municipal func-
tions contemplated by Article VI, Section 28. The es-
sential construction tasks incident to improving, 
refurbishing and constructing structures in urban areas 
whether publicly or privately owned will ordinarily 
cause temporary inconveniences such as detours for pe-
destrian and vehicular traffic. Such matters are incon-
sequential when compared with the interference which 
is prohibited by the constitution as a usurpation of the 
political power inherent in the electors residing in a 
municipality. This Court defined the nature and scope 
of prohibited state interference in the early case of 
Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 
536, 271 P . 961 (1928) when it said in connection with 
what is now Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Consti-
tution, "We think it clear that the undoubted purpose 
of the constitutional provision is to hold inviolate the 
right of local self-government of cities and towns with 
respect to municipal improvements, money, property, 
effects, the levying of taxes, and the performance of 
municipal functions . . ." (271 P . at 972). 
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A final aspect of the delegation issue involves the 
so-called "state purpose doctrine". In cases involving 
direct state agency intervention with municipal activi-
ties the court has properly looked for a justifiable state 
interest requiring protection. For example, the attempt-
ed regulation of Salt Lake City sewage disposal facil-
ities by the State Water Pollution Control Board would 
not have been an unlawful interference with a municipal 
function if there would have been a showing that the 
city was causing a menace to the health and safety of 
other state residents. State Water Pollution Board v. 
Salt Lake City, supra. Under this rationale it could be 
said the state agency must protect a state interest rather 
than merely perform a municipal function. Appellants 
argue for the extension of the requirement of state pur-
pose into the local option area of municipal law relying 
on dictum in Backman v. Salt Lake County, supra, and 
the dissenting opinions in Branch v. Salt Lake Cotmty 
Service Area No. 2, supra. The incongruous result is 
that water, sewer and swimming pools involve overrid-
ing state purposes but civic centers and hospitals do not. 
Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, supra, 
(swimming pool); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 
supra, (civic center); and Carter v. Beaver County 
Service Area No. 1, supra, (hospital). We submit that 
the interpretation urged upon the court by Appellants 
is unnecessarily confusing. As was pointed out, both 
the Backman and Carter cases were decided on issues 
which are unrelated to the questions raised in this case. 
The court decided the Branch case by recognizing sig-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
nificant public needs without specific reference in the 
majority opinions to state purposes. David O. Porter 
summarized and reconciled Utah and other "Ripper 
Clause" delegation cases without mention of the state 
purpose doctrine by emphasizing the following basic but 
not mutually exclusive principles, "(1) the legislature 
cannot delegate to an elected municipal body; (2) the 
legislature may not delegate the taxing power except 
to such an elective body on the ground that "taxation 
without representation is tyranny"; and (3) local gov-
ernments are inherently better suited than the state leg-
islature to determine the scope and depth of their activ-
ities and services". (Porter, supra, at 481). Respondents 
respectfully submit that the proposed Redevelopment 
Agency project avoids the constitutional prohibitions 
enunciated by this court and summarized by Mr. Por-
ter. 
If the court elects to apply the state purpose test, 
it should find, as did the trial court, that the subject 
Redevelopment Agency plan has significant state-wide 
impact. "The public evils, social and economic, of con-
ditions of slum areas in large cities are matters of state 
concern, since they vitally affect the health, safety, and 
welfare of the public . . ." 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Do-
main, § 42 (1966) and cases therein cited. The record 
abundantly supports a finding of state purposes. For 
example, sales tax revenues will be sharply increased, 
the state tourism industry will be expanded and the 
project will have a multiplier effect on the economy of 
the state. (R. 151-152). The problems relating to urban 
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blight which affect the entire state and nation are proper 
subjects for state legislative attention. "[Substand-
ard, decadent, or blighted areas . . . constitute a serious 
and growing menace injurious and inimical to the safe-
ty, health, morals, and welfare of the people through-
out the United States." Annot. 45 A.L.R. 3d 1096 at 
1100 (1972). The proposed parking facility is an essen-
tial part of an integrated plan to rehabilitate some of the 
most blighted slum areas in the state. The court has 
not been called upon previously to determine whether 
the objectives of redevelopment involve significant state 
interest rather than purely local functions. Other states 
with constitutional provisions comparable to Utah's 
Article VI, Section 28 have properly held that redevel-
opment activities are functions justifying state legisla-
tion. In re Bunker Hill Renewal Project IB, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 74, 389 P.2d 538 (1964); Fellom v. Redevelop-
ment Agency, 157 Cal.App.2d 243, 320 P.2d 884 
(1958); Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114 (Colo. 
1961); People v. Newton, 101 P.2d 21 (Colo. 1940); 
Romano v. Housing Authority of the City of Newark, 
123 N.J .L. 428, 10 A.2d 181 (1939), and the compan-
ion case of Kantor v. City of Perth Amboy, 123 N.J.L. 
504, 10 A.2d 184 (1939). These cases are in point de-
spite semantic differences in the constitutions of the re-
spective states. We cannot agree with the assertion of 
Appellants that "in California the authority for rede-
velopment agencies to act is established by a state con-
stitutional provision" (Appellants' Brief p. 20). The 
section of the California Constitution cited by Appel-
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lants, Article X I I I , Section 19 which is now Article 
XVI , Section 16, is a part of an article concerning 
revenue and taxation. I t applies to the alloca-
tion of tax revenues generated from redevelopment 
project areas. In California as in Utah there is no ex-
press constitutional provision establishing redevelop-
ment agencies or comparable public entities, but the 
California Supreme Court has upheld the constitution-
ality of redevelopment activities as will be set out more 
fully hereafter. 
The argument by Appellants that the City had 
authority to control the problems which led to the exist-
ence of the blighted central city project area does not 
square with the facts. The use of the traditional city 
powers of zoning, law enforcement, declaring and abat-
ing nuisances, controlling structures under building, 
fire and sanitation codes and even the existence of the 
power to acquire and dispose of property did not solve 
the problems. The obvious legislative intent of the Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act was to provide appro-
priate statutory opportunity for cities and counties to 
create agencies with unique capacity to qualify for fed-
eral financing and to coordinate private with public de-
velopment. (R. 176). By this means different programs 
have been initiated to achieve solutions in areas where 
the city historically has been notably unsuccessful. See 
Sundby, "The Elimination and Prevention of Urban 
Blight", 1959 Wis.LMev. 73; and Note, "The Con-
cepts of Urban Renewal", 37 So. Cal.L.Rev. 55 (1964) 
in which a variety of redevelopment devises and sources 
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of financing are explained and information concerning 
typical project areas before and after redevelopment 
is furnished. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD 
THAT THE PROPOSED REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY BONDS DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
A DEBT OF THE CITY WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF UTAH CONSTITUTION AR-
TICLE XIV, SECTIONS 3 AND 4. 
The City would not exceed its debt limit if an ad-
ditional $15,000,000.00 of bonds were issued as general 
obligation indebtedness of Salt Lake City (See Exhibit 
17). But the trial court's finding that the proposed Re-
development Bonds cannot constitute a debt of the City 
should be affirmed so as to avoid the unnecessary reduc-
tion of available debt capacity and for the following 
additional reasons: 
A. The Redevelopment Agency is an independent 
"quasi-municipal" corporation and/or a "special dis-
trict and not the City nor a department, division or 
subdivision thereof. 
Appellants on appeal continue the inconsistent ar-
guments which were initiated in their amended com-
plaint concerning the status of the Redevelopment 
Agency. As to the Article VI delegation issue they con-
tend the Agency is a separate entity, but as to the Ar-
ticle X I V debt issue they argue the two have a single 
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identity so that the agency is merely a department or 
subdivision of the City. While perpetuation of this in-
consistency into the appeal phase of this litigation is 
procedurally correct, it evidences a critical weakness in 
Appellants' position. This dilemma was entirely avoided 
by the trial court when it determined as a matter of 
both fact and law that the Agency is a separate legal 
entity administered by the same municipal legislative 
body. (Findings of Fact, 8, 12, 13 and 14 at R. 93-95 
and Conclusions of Law 3 and 4 at R. 98-99). 
Contrary to the contention of Appellants, the ab-
sence in the Utah Neighborhood Development Act of 
a preamble-type legislative acknowledgment of the 
independence of the Agency is not controlling. The 
essential elements of the separate legal existence of the 
Agency are set out in the Act making an express legis-
lative finding or declaration superfluous. Section 11-19-
23.1 in describing the powers of the public body (the 
City in this instance) authorizes cooperation in redevel-
opment projects to which end the City may among 
other things: "(1) Dedicate, sell, convey or lease any 
of its property to a redevelopment agency; . . . (8) pur-
chase and buy or otherwise acquire land in a project 
area from an agency for redevelopment in accordance 
with the plan . . .". In addition, Section 11-19-23.12 
allows the agency to acquire property of the City 
through eminent domain with the consent of the City. 
Such authorization would not be necessary if the Re-
development Agency were a department or subdivision 
of the City. Furthermore, the Act authorizes the crea-
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tion of redevelopment agencies with power to transact 
business (11-19-3), borrow money, implement project 
plans (11-19-13), acquire by purchase, lease, option or 
by other means real and personal property (11-19-
23.9(1)) and to acquire real property by eminent do-
main (11-19-23.9(2)); to sell, convey, lease or otherwise 
dispose of property (11-19-22) and to issue bonds 
(11-19-23.2 and 11-19-25). All of the above powers are 
to be exercised in the name of the respective redevelop-
ment agency. 
The operations of the Agency are definitely sepa-
rate from those of the City and the City has treated and 
dealt with the Agency as a separate entity. Employees 
of the Agency are not paid by the City and they do not 
qualify for tenure or other City employment benefits. 
(R. 174, 178). The Agency maintains separate of-
fices, and pays its own rent. It keeps separate account-
ing records and handles its own funds which are main-
tained in a separate bank account under the sole con-
trol of the Agency (R. 178). Its fiscal years have been 
entirely different than those of the City. It has a sepa-
rate budget. (See Exhibit 9). The Agency has bor-
rowed funds in its own name by issuing promissory 
notes which have expressly negated any obligation or 
liability against the City. (Exhibits 15 and 16). It has 
obtained million of dollars in loans and grants which 
would not have been available to the City. (R. 176), 
The agency retains and pays for its own independent 
professional advisors. (R. 178). 
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This court has firmly established the distinction 
between quasi-municipal corporations or special districts 
and cities, towns, counties, school districts and other 
true municipal corporations. Lehi City v. Meiling, 
supra, is much cited for its holding that a metropolitan 
water district serving five communities was a quasi-
municipal corporation to which debt limitation did not 
apply. But the companion case of Provo City v. Evans, 
87 Utah 292, 48 P.2d 555 (1935), which was handed 
down at the same time as the Lehi City case is equally 
important because it adopted the Lehi City majority 
opinion by reference and applied it to a metropolitan 
water district that was coterminous with the city boun-
daries of Provo. Other cases upholding the special dis-
trict concept are Freeman v. Stewart, supra; Tygesen 
v. Magna Water Co., supra; and Patterick v. Carbon 
County Water Conservancy District, supra. Perhaps 
the rationale of the above cases can best be summarized 
by a portion of an instructive opinion of this court in 
the case of Barlow v. Clearfield City Corp., supra, in-
volving a water district with the same boundaries as 
Clearfield City and a contractual arrangement between 
the City and the district under which the City would 
distribute the water for the district and collect revenues 
from water users. In rejecting an argument of identity 
between the district and the City this court held in part, 
"The City and the District are two separate and dis-
tinct entities organized generally for separate and dis-
tinct purposes but whose purposes converge and cover 
some of the same objectives. Sometimes the purposes 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
of one dovetail and coordinate with those of the other. 
. . . So we hold that this is an obligation of the District 
and not a debt of the city". (268 P.2d at 687). 
The possibility of creating an entity with formal 
appearance of a quasi-municipal corporation but with-
out any substantial purpose is conceded. To such entities 
the warning of circumvention of debt limits sounded 
in Backman v. Salt Lake County, supra, is appropos. 
But it should be apparent that the Redevelopment 
Agency was not created merely to expand the bonding 
capacity of the City. The Agency has no taxing power 
I t anticipates no revenue from the City in connection 
with the proposed parking facility (R. 152), but if it 
received any such revenues they could not be used to re-
pay the proposed $15,000,000.00 bond issue ( 11-19-
^ST5^3ddb&). Respondents emphasize that Agency purposes 
and objectives are both substantial and separate from 
those of the City. 
Neither the Backman case nor Carter v. Beaver 
County Service Area No. 1, upra, should be interpreted 
as a limitation or restriction of the special district doc-
trine established and consistently upheld by this court. 
Fortunately Justice Ellett on behalf of a majority of 
this court, explained the holdings of both the Backman 
and Carter cases. In Branch v. Salt Lake County 
Service Area No. 2, supra. While applying again the 
special district doctrine the court said, "In the Carter 
case this court thought the services permissible under the 
act were too many, and the Legislature attempted to 
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and did correct the defect by its 1967 amendment . . ." 
(460 P.2d at 815). I t also limited Backman to a find-
ing of noncompliance with election procedures. The spe-
cial district concept continues to be a vital, clearly de-
fined part of the common law of the state of Utah. By 
application of this principal the conclusion is inescapable 
that even if the Agency were empowered to incur debt 
by issuing bonds to be repaid by proceeds from a special 
tax levied upon residents of Salt Lake City, this would 
not result in "debt" as that word is applied by the Utah 
Constitution to cities, counties, towns or school districts. 
B. The Redevelopment bonds will not constitute 
debt of the City because they are to be repaid from a 
special fund. 
If the Agency is held to be a division of the City 
rather than a separate quasi-municipal corporation or a 
special district, then the proposed bonds will not consti-
tute a debt of the City because they are to be repaid 
from a special fund. A pledge to repay bonded indebted-
ness together with accrued interest from an identifi-
able fund separate from the general fund of the muni-
cipality does not create debt in the constitutional sense 
under the special fund doctrine which was established 
by Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321,279 P . 878 (1929). 
See Note, "Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal 
Indebtedness", 1966 Utah Law Review, 462, 471-478. 
Appellants concede that the pledge of revenues 
to be generated by the proposed parking facility comes 
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within the special fund doctrine. However, as to the 
tax allocation portion of the revenue sources for repay-
ment of the bonds, Appellants contend a debt is created 
by reason of a much criticized limitation purportedly 
arising from the holding of Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 
83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933). (For criticism of the 
Fjeldsted type limitation on the special fund exception 
see Williams and Nehemkis, "Municipal Improvements 
as Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations", 37 
Colum. L.Rev. 177 (1937), which was cited by this 
court with approval in Conder v. University of Utah, 
123 Utah 182, 187-88, 257 P.2d 367, 370-71 (1953)). 
Because it appears Appellants have misinterpreted the 
the ruling of Fjeldsted it may be helpful to outline the 
facts as well as the decision reached in that case. For 
a period of six years prior to the filing of a petition by 
Mr. Fjeldsted the net surplus from operation of the 
Ogden waterworks system was paid into the general 
fund. When it became necessary to construct an addi-
tional reservoir, build a conduit pipeline from artesian 
wells in Ogden canyon to the city, install various pipe-
line replacements and purchase and install water 
meters, the City proposed to pledge its waterworks 
revenues as repayment of $645,000.00 water revenue 
bonds. There was an express finding based on an ad-
mission of the City that the "proposed improvements 
will afford no new source of revenue" (28 P.2d at 149). 
Reasoning that the proposed pledge of the waterworks 
surplus as security for the waterworks revenue bonds 
would eliminate a source of revenue to the general fund 
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which would have to be replaced by additional real prop-
erty taxes, a majority of the court held that the Barnes 
v. Lehi City, supra, special fund doctrine must be 
limited in Fjeldsted type situations where an actual di-
version from the general fund is required thereby in-
creasing the burden on the general taxpayer. Two 
justices joined in a vigorous dissent pointing out among 
other things that the majority had departed from the 
great weight of authority. 
By disregarding the actual termination of the pay-
ment by Ogden City of surplus waterworks revenues 
into the general fund and by speculating about in-
creased operation and maintenance costs. Appellants 
urge the conclusion that the Fjeldsted court was deal-
ing merely with the possibility of future diversion from 
the general fund. We cannot agree with this interpreta-
tion and it is respectfully submitted that this court has 
previously rejected a similar challenge. Utah Power 
and Light Company v. Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79 
P.2d 61, 67 (1938). The indirect "feeding" of the spe-
cial fund from the general fund was allowed in Utah 
Power and Light Company v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 
74 P.2d 1191 (1937) in which Provo City was author-
ized to pay into the district utility bond special fund the 
reasonable value of electricity used by the City. Ob-
viously the Fjeldsted restriction on the special fund 
doctrine was more narrow and limited in 1938 than the 
scope of the restriction now being advocated by Appel-
lants. 
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I t appears that the limited special fund doctrine 
of the Fjeldsted case was overruled in Conder v. Uni-
versity of Utah, supra, in which this court upheld the is-
suance of bonds to be repaid from a special fund con-
sisting of revenues from University of Utah dormitories 
and land grant funds. Since proceeds from the land 
grant funds had previously been deposited in the uni-
versity general fund the pledge constituted a diversion 
from the general fund. In Barlow v. Clearfield City 
Corp., supra, the court applied the special fund theory 
in upholding a contract between Clearfield City and 
the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and it 
expressly noted it had refused to apply the Fjeldsted 
restriction in the Conder case. 
As early as 1937 it was reported that only South 
Dakota and Utah adhered to the restricted special fund 
doctrine. If there is anything remaining to the Fjeld-
sted restriction after Barlow, Conder and the two Utah 
Power and Light Company cases, the instant case pre-
sents a suitable vehicle for the court to clarify this area 
with an express repudiation of the Fjeldsted limitation. 
Of course many Utah cases upholding the special fund 
doctrine have not involved any diversion of monies from 
the general fund. Freeman v. Stewart, supra; Tygesen 
v. Magna Water Company, supra; and Patterick v. 
Carbon County Water Conservancy District, supra. 
These cases are appropriate and sufficient authority for 
the determination of the instant case. 
If the Fjeldsted holding has not been overruled, 
it is not in point because the instant case involves no 
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past or future diversion from the general funds of Salt 
Lake City. Section 11-19-23.2 of the Utah Neighbor-
hood Development Act, avoids the imposition of future 
liability upon the City by requiring that "the bonds shall 
be made payable, as to both principle and interest, sole-
ly from the income, proceeds, revenues and funds of 
the Agency . . .". Section 11-19-25(5) (Utah Code An-
notated, Interim Supp. 1974) of the Amendment to the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act expressly pro-
vides that redevelopment agency bonds are not a 
general obligation or debt of the City. 
Consistent with these statutory provisions the pro-
posed bond resolution, an attachment to Exhibit 1, con-
templates in Section 11 thereof the establishment of a 
special fund consisting of tax increment revenues and 
the net rental receipts from the Parking Facilities. Sec-
tion 3 of the proposed resolution states that the bonds 
and the interest thereon are not a debt of the City. To 
avoid any possible misunderstanding and as an addi-
tional safeguard of the City's general fund, the pro-
posed bond form as set out in Section 26 of the Bond 
Resolution includes a legend notifying the bondholders 
that the City and State cannot be liable for any debt 
service relating to the bonds. Salt Lake City in its Ordi-
nance of Ratification, Exhibit 2, protected the credit 
of the City and avoided any contingent liability by in-
cluding paragraph 4 which disclaims any responsibility 
on the part of the City to pay any of the costs incurred 
by the Agency in connection with the plan including 
the repayment of any debt. 
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I t is clear that bondholders must look only to the 
special fund of the Redevelopment Agency for repay-
ment of the principal and interest of the proposed 
Bonds. There can be no diversion from the general funds 
of the City for the benefit of the Agency or its creditors. 
For a general summary of the numerous cases in sup-
port of the special fund doctrine, see Annot., 72 A.L.R. 
687 (1931); Annot., 96 A.L.R. 1385 (1935); and 
Annot., 146 A.L.R. 328 (1943). 
A discussion of what was the restricted special 
fund doctrine is not complete without a detailed consid-
eration of Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 
28 P.2d 161 (1933) a case which was heard at the same 
time as the rehearing of Fjeldsted. Both the Fjeldsted 
and Wadsworth opinions were issued by the court on 
the same day. The water system in Santaquin had been 
financed by general obligation bonds and water user 
revenues. The bond issue had been retired so that all 
of the net surplus of water revenues was being deposited 
in the general fund of the City. The wood stave pipes 
were leaking so badly that the City was losing fifty 
percent of the water going into the distribution system. 
I t proposed to issue $22,000.00 of water revenue bonds 
to cover the replacement of the existing distribution 
lines with cast iron pipes. Pursuant to statutory author-
ization (the Granger Act) the City attempted to im-
pound and allocate to a special fund only the portion 
of water revenues that the value of the improvements 
bore to the old system. I t was acknowledged that unless 
water rates were increased the improvements would 
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generate no additional income because the system was 
not being extended to facilitate hookups by new users. 
The Wadsworth court was properly suspicious of 
the Santaquin City Council's appraisal based on an en-
gineering report which valued the improvements at 
$47,950.00 and the existing system at $11,950.00. With-
out much difficulty the court uncovered two significant 
errors in the appraisal formula and concluded that the 
valuations were arbitrary and unreasonable. I t gave 
helpful and specific instructions as to how the appraisals 
could be corrected (28 P.2d at 174). I t then held, 
"Where improvements or betterments are built into an 
existing system or project, the revenues earned by such 
improvements or betterments based on a proper ap-
praisement of the old system and the improvements and 
betterments, may be pledged to the payment of revenue 
bonds as provided in the act. . . ." (28 P.2d at 175). 
The court in Wadsworth seemed to anticipate the 
concept upon which tax increment allocation is founded. 
However, the Wadsworth case goes beyond the holding 
of the trial court in the instant case. Unlike the City 
of Santaquin we do not ask for judicial authorization 
for a diversion of revenues from the general fund of the 
City. As of the date of the equalized assessed valuation 
immediately preceeding the initiation of the redevelop-
ment plan, the City was receiving no tax revenues 
based on improvements resulting from Agency efforts 
in the project area. The City, the Appellants, other 
city taxpayers similarly situated and other taxing enti-
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ties had and have no justifiable basis for expectations 
of increased tax revenues from the blighted project 
area. I t would be proper for the court to take judicial 
notice that without action as proposed by the agency 
the project area would continue its decline in assessed 
valuation despite inflation, improvement of adjoining 
areas and the influence of otherwise favorable economic 
conditions, if any. 
I t should be emphasized that the tax increment al-
location will be available to the Agency only until it 
has repaid loans, advances and any indebtedness or any 
interest thereon. All monies received thereafter based 
upon the increased tax increment allocation shall be 
paid to the City and other taxing entities. Section 11-
19-29(1) (b), (Utah Code Annotated, Interim Supp. 
1974). Rather than diverting any funds from the City 
and other taxing entities, the Agency projects will ulti-
mately becomes the sources of increased tax revenues to 
entities which have not contributed to the cost of the 
improvements. 
Perhaps the basic concept of the special fund aspect 
of the tax allocation financing was best summarized by 
the California Court of Appeals for the Third District 
when, under a specific constitutional provision, it con-
sidered the first tax increment appeal and held, "When 
augmented property values produce taxes in excess of 
the amount thus payable to taxing agencies, then . . . 
the excess is to be allocated to a special fund of the re-
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development agency to pay principal and interest of 
bonds. . . . After the bond obligation is paid off, the 
separate allocation of excess revenues ceases, and all the 
tax income goes to the taxing agencies". Redevelopment 
Agency of the City of Sacramento v. Malachi, 31 Cal. 
Rptr. 92, 95 (Cal.Ct.App. 1963). 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETER-
MINED THAT THE PROPOSED REDEVEL-
OPMENT AGENCY BONDS WILL NOT IN-
VOLVE LENDING OF CREDIT BY THE 
CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY OR THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
The enabling tax increment statute (Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 11-19-23.3, 25-35, Interim Supp. 
1974), the proposed bond resolution (Exhibit 1), the 
proposed bond form, and the City Ordinance of Ratifi-
cation (Exhibit 2), all prohibit the use of credit of the 
City for the repayment of the bonded indebtedness. 
In Part B of Point I I we have cited points and authori-
ties in support of the determination of the trial court that 
the proposed bond issue, and and any interest thereon, 
can be repaid only from a special fund. The entire finan-
cial plan involves the allocation of the revenues from 
identifiable increases in assessed valuation and from 
parking facility revenues. These are the only revenue 
sources which will supply the Special Fund. Bondhold-
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ers must look solely to the Special Fund for repayment 
of their bonds and payment of accrued interest. Under 
these circumstances there is no lending of credit con-
trary to Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. (Findings of Fact 14 and 15, R. 95-96. Conclu-
sions of Law 5, R. 99). 
In 1968, this court resolved a lending of credit 
question involving the issuance of industrial bonds by 
Tooele County to finance the construction of a magnes-
ium plant near the Great Salt Lake. After quoting 
pertinent provisions of what is now Article VI, Section 
29 of the Constitution, Justice Crockett in the primary 
majority opinion made the following observation which 
is also applicable to the proposed Agency project: " I t 
seems evident that the legislature in framing this Act 
and the defendants in planning this project have been 
cognizant of the above constitutional interdiction and 
have exercised care to avoid collision with it by safe-
guarding against any possibility that Tooele County or 
its taxpayers will be charged with any obligation from 
this contract." Allen v. Tooele County, 21 Utah 2d 383, 
445 P.2d 994, 995 (1968). 
Since Article VI, Section 29 prohibits the lending 
of credit to any railroad, telegraph or other private in-
dividual or corporate enterprise or undertaking, the 
points and authorities concerning the public purposes 
of the proposed project as set out in Point IV should 
also be considered in connection with the lending of 
credit issue. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-
TION OF THE PROPOSED PARKING FA-
CILITY INVOLVES PUBLIC PURPOSES. 
The primary thrust of Appellants' attack is aimed 
at the parking facility. Indirectly this challenges the 
entire plan for the project area because the anticipated 
commercial development must be serviced by conven-
ient, adequate parking. The trial court finding of public 
purpose for the project was properly based on consid-
eration of the overall objectives of the proposed inte-
grated plan. Appellants ask that this viewpoint be nar-
rowed to focus on the possible rental of some of the 
stalls by adjoining businesses which will be benefitted 
thereby. The trial court approach to this question is 
consistent with the holdings of the U. S. Supreme Court 
and the great weight of authority. After warning 
against the fallacy of evaluating a project one building 
at a time the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the District 
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 and observed, 
"The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, 
integrated plan could be developed for the region, in-
cluding not only new homes but also schools, churches, 
parks, streets and shopping centers. In this way it was 
hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be con-
trolled and the birth of future slums prevented". Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35, 75 St.Ct. 98, 99 
L.Ed. 27 (1954). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
The Utah legislature, recognizing the public need 
to arrest the expansion and infection of blight, enacted 
similar enabling legislation known as the Utah Neigh-
borhood Development Act. The Berman court placed 
high credence in such legislative determinations of pub-
lic need. "Subject to specific constitutional limitations, 
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has 
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such 
cases the legislature not the judiciary, is the main guar-
dian of the public needs to be served. . . .". (348 U.S. 
at 32). For an interesting comparison of the costs of 
blighted areas with the costs of comparable non-blighted 
areas see, "Cost of Urban Blight", Urban Land, May 
1946, as discussed in Brown, "Urban Redevelopment", 
29 Boston Univ.L.Rev. 318 (1949). 
But the sensitivity to conditions detrimental or in-
imical to the public health, safety or welfare did not 
stop with the legislature. Pursuant to statutory guide-
lines both the Agency and the City surveyed and studied 
the project areas in which the parking facility is to be 
constructed. Several reports were generated as a result 
of the studies including Exhibit 7 which indicates the 
location of every structure in the project area with a 
determination as to those which were deficient or sub-
standard. The conclusion that the area was blighted is 
clearly supportable. See, Annot., "What Constitutes 
'Blighted Area' Within Urban Renewal and Redevelop-
ment Statutes", 45 A.L.R. 3d 1096 (1972). The proj-
ect area plan (Exhibit 4) entitled C.B.D. West Neigh-
borhood Development Program, was then prepared de-
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scribing the project area and stating eight development 
objectives all of which involve public purposes. 
A public hearing was held February 4, 1971, to 
review and consider the proposed plan. The minutes of 
that hearing evidence an awareness of then existing pub-
lic need (Exhibit 5). The City then adopted the C.B.D. 
West Neighborhood Development Program by ordi-
nance (Exhibit 3) making specific findings as to the 
public nature of the purposes of the project plan. 
The trial court took into account not only the de-
termination of public purpose by the legislature as evi-
denced by the passage of the redevelopment legislation, 
the conclusion of the City Commission after a public 
hearing and the results of the surveys and studies of 
the Agency, but also testimony taken at trial. Specific 
portions of the pertinent testimony are discussed in 
connection with the "state purpose doctrine" in Section 
C of Point I and need not be repeated here. (R. 151-
152, 180-181). Under similar circumstances courts in 
other jurisdictions have upheld findings of public pur-
pose. Space will not permit citation of the numerous 
cases in point, but the carefully written opinion and the 
authorities referred to in Redevelopment Agency of 
City and County of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. 
App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954) may be helpful to 
the court. See also the more recent California cases of 
Babcock v. Community Redevelopment Agency of the 
City of Los Angeles, 306 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1957) and In 
re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, supra. The 
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Idaho Supreme Court recognized the public purposes 
of a redevelopment project in a condemnation case, 
Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 
Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 (1972). Dozens of cases in 
point are summarized in Section 4, Annot., "Statutes 
Upheld As Serving Public Use, Urban Redevelopment 
Laws", 44 A.L.R.2d 1414, 1420-1426 (1955). This 
annotation together with the Later Case Service, for 
volume 44 A.L.R.2d, indicate the Supreme Courts in 
the following jurisdictions on one or more occasions 
have found public purpose or public use in challenged 
redevelopment projects: United States, Alabama, Ar-
kansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, North 
Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and Wiscon-
sin. See also, Mandelker, "Public Purpose in Urban Re-
development," 28 Tulane LMev. 96 (1953). 
So lopsided is the weight if authority in favor of 
urban redevelopment laws that the A.L.R. editor could 
observe as of the time of writing, "In two instances, the 
purposes permitted to be served by the redevelopment 
acts in question have been held not to constitute public 
uses, and the statutes have been held invalid on that 
ground", Annot., 44 A.L.R. 2d at 1426 (1955). The 
cases then cited are the only redevelopment cases ap-
pearing in Appellants' brief concerning the question of 
public purpose, Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So. 
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2d 663 (Fla. 1952) and Housing Authority v. John-
son, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E. 2d 891 (1953). Both of these 
cases turned on the use of the power of eminent domain, 
an issue which is not before this court. In any event 
neither case presently represents the law of its respec-
tive state. After the decision in Johnson, Georgia 
amended the eminent domain article of its constitution. 
Thereafter the Georgia court has consistently upheld 
findings by municipalities of public purposes for re-
development projects. Bailey v. Housing Authority, 214 
Ga. 790, 107 S.E.2d 812 (1959); Allen v. City Coun-
cil of Augusta, 215 Ga. 778, 113 S.E.2d 621 (1960) 
and Freedman v. Housing Authority of the City of At-
lanta, 108 Ga. App. 418, 136 S.E.2d 544 (1963). The 
holding of the Florida court in the Adams case was 
modified or overruled in Grubstein v. Urban Renewal 
Agency of City of Tampa, 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959) 
and definitely overruled in State v. County of Dade, 
210 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1968), a case involving issuance 
of bonds for a parking facility, restaurant and pilot 
training structure at the municipal airport. 
We are unable to see the relevance of the Washing-
ton case relied upon so heavily by Appellants, Hogue v. 
Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959). 
Hogue is an industrial development eminent domain 
case involving the attempted condemnation of parcels 
of 720 farms and residential lots involving approximate-
ly 2,175 acres all of which were situated outside the 
limits of the City of Seattle. The purpose of the acqui-
sition by the Port authority was to convert the lands 
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to industrial sites for resale to private businesses and 
industries to be serviced by a navigable waterway. From 
undispuated evidence the court expressly found the 
"lands are not congested urban lands, nor unoccupied 
lands, nor tide lands, nor wild, undeveloped lands, 
rather, they are well-developed agriculture and residen-
tial lands situated in King County outside the City 
limits of Seattle". Three of the Hague court justices 
dissented primarily on the grounds that it should not 
be necessary to show the lands were blighted or marginal 
so long as the ultimate purposes involved a public use. 
I t should not be inferred from the Hague case that 
the Washington Supreme Court would be unable to 
find public purpose in the proposed redevelopment plan 
now before this court. The cases are factually distin-
guishable and the Washington court has taken occasion 
to distinguish the Hogue decision from subsequent 
urban redevelopment cases. Miller v. City of Tacoma, 
61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963). The Miller 
opinion refers to footnotes in an appendix in which 
thirty-nine (39) "leading" cases from thirty-two (32) 
states are set out as authority for the proposition that 
urban renewal laws involve public purposes. Miller was 
then followed by the Washington court in Edwards v. 
City Council of City of Seattle, 3 Wash. App. 665, 479 
P.2d 120 (1970) and Petition of Port of Seattle in re 
Hove v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 392, 495 P.2d 
327 (1972). 
At the trial plaintiffs on direct examination asked 
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many questions regarding the classification of those who 
would be using the proposed parking facility. If the 
purpose of this line of questioning was to demonstrate 
the predominance of private benefits, it was not success-
ful. Private developers could be expected to furnish no 
more than the number of parking stalls required by ap-
plicable zoning laws for their particular development. 
This would be hopelessly inadequate to service increas-
ing public need and to replace the parking spaces which 
previously existed within the area. (R. 147-149). Con-
tinuous guaranteed use of some of the proposed 1300 
available stalls by adjoining businesses contributes to 
the economic feasibility of the proposed project. These 
companies will not receive preferential rates. (R. 169-
170). We fail to see any improper private benefit in 
connection with the proposed project. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD 
THAT THE ALLOCATION OF TAXES FOR 
REDEVELOPMENT PURPOSES AND THE 
USE OF THESE AND OTHER FUNDS IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE REDEVELOP-
MENT PROJECTS DOES NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Section 5 of Article X I I I of the Utah Constitu-
tion on one hand prohibits the legislature from impos-
ing taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town or 
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other municipal corporation and on the other hand 
authorizes the legislature by law to vest in the corporate 
authorities of county, city, town or other municipal cor-
porations, the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes of such corporations. The allocation of rev-
enues from the increased increment of assessed valua-
tion resulting after a redevelopment project is initiated 
does not involve the imposition of any tax. The Re-
development Agency is not empowered to impose a tax 
and taxing entities are not required or authorized to in-
crease a tax levy for redevelopment purposes. Use of 
tax increment financing cannot increase taxes levied by 
any or all of the taxing entities because the standard 
mill levy is merely applied to the increment of increased 
assessed valuation as well as to the base assesed valua-
tion and each taxing entity receives no less than what 
it would have received were it not for the redevelopment 
project. 
The Utah Neighborheed Development Act merely 
enables local government entities to create redevelop-
ment agencies in a manner which is entirely compatible 
with the constitutional authorization of Section 5 under 
which the legislature may vest in designated corporate 
authorities the power to assess and collect taxes for 
proper purposes. This court defined "for all purposes 
of such corporations" as being synonymous with "public 
purposes" in Denver & B. G. R. Co. v. Grand County, 
51 Utah 294, 170, P . 74, 76, 3 A.L.R. 1224 (1917). 
Suitable public purpose was found to support the con-
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stitutionality of a statute requiring Salt Lake County 
to construct a juvenile detention home. In Salt Lake 
County v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 134 P . 560 
(1913) this court quoted with approval f r o m 
a Missouri decision holding . . . "that the legislature, 
in case of its judgment the public good or welfare re-
quires it, may call upon counties or cities as state agen-
cies to assist the state in paying the expenses incurred 
for the public good." (134 P . at 563). 
State v. Stcmdford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P . 1061 
(1901) on which Appellants rely is not in point. That 
case involved a statute establishing a state board of 
horticulture and requiring counties to select fruit tree 
inspectors from names submitted by the state board, to 
hire the inspectors thus designated at a rate of compen-
sation and for a term set by the state and to pay the 
inspectors from county funds. A majority of the court 
found this program to be violative of Section 5 of Art-
icle X I I I and other constitutional provisions. I t re-
jected an argument that the inspectors were county 
authorities. In doing so it provided a useful definition 
by stating, "By the term 'corporate authorities' must 
be intended those municipal officers who are either di-
rectly elected by the population to be taxed or appointed 
in some mode to which they have given their assent." 
(66 P. at 1063). In contrast to the facts of Standford, 
the Redevelopment Agency is not supervised by a state 
agency or board, the state has nothing to do with the 
hiring and compensation of Agency employees and City 
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funds canont be used at the direction of the state for re-
development purposes. 
To avoid unnecessary repetition of points and 
authorities, Respondents refer the court to other perti-
nent sections of this brief including Section A of Point I 
concerning the voluntary creation of the Agency by 
the City; Section B of Point I concerning the admin-
istration of the Agency by the Board of Commissioners 
of the City; Section B of Point I I concerning repay-
ment of the redevelopment bonds from a special fund; 
and Point IV concerning the public purposes of the 
proposed project. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
ITS DETERMINATION THAT BUDGE-
TARY LAWS REGULATING CITIES ARE 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE REDEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY. 
The Agency is not a city of the first, second or 
third class as defined in the Uniform Municipal Fiscal 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 10-
10-23 to 10-10-75 (1973). Nor is the Agency a county, 
town or other municipal corporation. Because of its pur-
poses, its legal form, and its method of operation the 
Agency is a quasi-municipal corporation. Please see 
Section A of Point I I and the authorities therein cited 
for a more complete discussion of the legal nature of the 
Agency. 
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POINT VII. 
THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF TAXES 
USING AN ASSESSED VALUATION BASE 
DETERMINED IN 1970 IS NOT AN UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL RETROACTIVE APPLI-
CATION OF A STATUTE WHERE THE 
MILL LEVY TO BE APPLIED TO THE VAL-
UATION BASE IS PROSPECTIVE. 
In its Findings of Fact number 16 (R. 96) the 
trial court determined that the last equalized assessment 
roll available as of the February 11, 1971, the date 
of adoption of the Redevelopment Agency plan, 
utilized valuations assessed for the year 1970. Since 
there is no attempt under the statutory formula to allo-
cate revenues from past mill levies, the trial court also 
held in its Conclusions of Law that the allocation of 
future taxes under the tax increment formula does not 
constitute a retroactive application of the Utah Neigh-
borhood Development Act. (Conclusions of Law 9, R. 
99). The distinction between the mill levy and the 
arithmetic formula is valid and significant because it is 
the mill levy which requires affirmative action of the 
respective taxing entities. Whether the date of adoption 
of the original plan or the date of adoption of the 
amendment to the plan is used, in either case the base 
for tax increment purposes must be the last equalized 
assessment roll prior to one or the other of those dates. 
I t will not be possible to use some future equalized as-
sessment roll. Thus we fail to see how one date may be 
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retroactive and the other date not. Since retroactivity 
is determined by the date of the mill levy it is apparent 
that neither of the alternatives involves a retroactive 
application of the statute. 
The statutes being challenged do not impose crim-
inal sanctions, so constitutional prohibitions against ex 
post facto laws do not apply, 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitu-
tional Law (Retrospective Legislation), §§ 395-410 
(1964). By contrast, civil statutes may be applied retro-
actively or be retrospective in nature without violating 
state or federal constitutional provisions unless there 
is a resulting impairment of vested rights. 16 Am. Jur. 
2d, Constitutional Law (Other Retrospective Laws), 
§§ 413-418 (1964). Appellants acknowledge there is no 
impairment of property rights or other vested rights. 
The statutes in question are not retrospective in nature, 
nor do the proposals involve retroactive application, but 
even if such were not the case, objections on constitu-
tional grounds should not obtain. 
Respondents respectfully suggest that the earlier 
equalized assessment roll is the appropriate base for 
the tax increment calculation even though it is to the 
advantage of the Agency to use the more recent lower 
assessed valuation base. (See Exhibit 18 and the com-
putations at the top of page 40 of Appellants' brief). 
This position is supported by a case in point, Rede-
velopment Agency of the City and County of San Fran-
Cisco v. Cooper, 72 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
The court there dealt with both the adoption of the plan 
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and a subsequent amendment to that plan. I t determined 
that the appropriate assessed valuation base was the 
one immediately prior to the adoption of the plan. 
Whether or not this learned court agrees with the trial 
court and the Cooper decision as to the date of equal-
ized assessed valuation to be used, it is of utmost im-
portance that the prospective nature of the statutory 
formula as applied to future levies of taxes be acknowl-
edged. 
POINT VIII. 
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET 
THE BURDEN OF OVERCOMING A PRE-
SUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY AND CON-
STITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH NEIGH-
BORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT AND THE 
VALIDITY AND CORRECTNESS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT HOLDING. 
There is a presumption of statutory validity and 
constitutionality and one who questions it has the bur-
den of convincing the court of the unconstitutionality 
of the statute being challenged. 16 C. J.S., Constitutional 
Law, § 99 (1956). In Branch v. Salt Lake County 
Service Area No. 2, supra, this court quoted with ap-
proval the following: 
"In determining constitutionality, statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional until the 
contrary is clearly shown. I t is only when 
statutes manifestly infringe upon some con-
stitutional provision that they can be declared 
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void. Every reasonable presumption must be 
indulged in and every reasonable doubt re-
solved in favor of constitutionality." Broad-
bent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939 at 
943 (1943) and the numerous previous cases 
therein cited. (460 P.2d at 815). 
The trial court viewed extensive documentary evi-
dence and considered the testimony of witnesses before 
finding for Respondents. The judgment predominant-
ly involved a determination of factual issues on ques-
tions of public purpose and state purpose. Factual find-
ings were also required in connection with some of the 
other issues involved in this case. There is a presumption 
that the holding of the trial court is valid and correct. 
. . . "[Ejvery reasonable intendment ought to be in-
dulged in favor of the validity and correctness of the 
judgment under review, and it will not be disturbed un-
less the Appellant meets his burden of affirmatively 
showing error." Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Com-
pcmy, 3 Utah 2d 274, 282 P.2d 335, 337 (1955); Mc-
Collum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468, 469 
(1952). 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed project will make possible improve-
ments and developments having market values of an 
estimated $32,000,000.00 to approximately $49,000,-
000.00. The resulting increase in assessed valua-
tion will not require any increase in the mill levy nor 
any increased burden to the taxpayers. The statutory 
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authorization for this opportunity to meet some urgent 
public needs is provided in the basic Utah Neighbor-
hood Development Act and its more recent amendments 
authorizing allocation of taxes imposed in increments 
of increased assessed valuation. Other states have suc-
cessfully demonstrated that this method of municipal 
finance effectively enables a redevelopment project to 
underwrite on its own the cost of eliminating blight 
while simultaneously strengthening municipal core 
areas to the benefit of both city and state. 
In summarizing the reply of Respondents to the 
numerous and sometimes inconsistent positions taken 
by Appellants, we emphasize that there is no unlawful 
delegation from the legislature to the Redevelopment 
Agency because the Agency was created by the volun-
tary exercise of local option by Salt Lake City. Also 
the administrative head of the Agency is a Board of 
Commissioners who serve as the elected members of the 
Board of Commissioners of the City. 
If, contrary to the holding of the trial court and 
the position of Respondents, some form of delegation 
is found to be involved in connection with the creation 
and operation of the Agency, then such delegation is 
not unconstitutional because the Agency is not a special 
commission, private corporation or association. I t is a 
quasi-municipal corporation which does not manage, 
supervise or interfere with any municipal function. The 
existence of similar quasi-municipal corporations has 
long been acknowledged by this court. Or, in the alter-
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native, the purposes and objectives of the Agency have 
statewide impact so as to justify the attention of the 
state legislature. A legislative delegation is not pro-
hibited where there is a showing of state purpose. 
The proposed Redevelopment Agency Bonds will 
not constitute a debt of the City because the Agency is 
a special district and not a department, division or sub-
division of the City. Even if the Agency were deemed 
to be a department of the City the proposed bonds 
would not constitute a debt of the City because they are 
to be repaid from a special fund comprised of revenues 
to be received from the operation of the proposed park-
ing facility together with those generated by an alloca-
tion of the increment of increased assessed valuation 
experienced in the redevelopment project area after 
adoption of the project plan for redevelopment. Con-
sistent with the restrictions imposed by law and con-
tractual provisions upon the Agency in connection with 
the repayment of the proposed bonds, potential bond-
holders will be put on notice that they can look only to 
the revenue sources set out above for repayment of the 
bonds. Under these circumstances the bonds cannot be-
come a general obligation of the City, County or any 
other taxing entity and the mill levy may not be in-
creased in order to pay principal or interest on the 
bonds. Thus there is no lending of the credit of the 
City, County or any other taxing entity to the Agency 
or any private entity. 
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The purposes of redevelopment p r o j e c t s 
similar to the one before the court have been held to 
involve public purposes rather than private benefits by 
the U. S. Supreme Court and by the courts of last re-
sort in numerous other jurisdictions. Any private bene-
fit or detriment is inconsequential compared with the 
overall objectives of the plan. The parking facility is an 
essential part of the overall development of the two 
block project area in central Salt Lake City. 
The allocation of taxes based on a defined incre-
ment of assessed valuation does not amount to the im-
position of a tax and Respondents have demonstrated 
that the proposed project will not result in any direct 
or indirect tax burden. In fact, after the temporary 
allocation of the tax increment, the increased assessed 
valuation will then be available to other taxing entities 
even though they did not participate by sharing any of 
the costs of the improvements resulting from the pro-
posed development. In addition it should be clear that 
the Agency is not a city and therefore it is not subject 
to budgetary laws regulating cities. I t is equally clear 
that the allocation of a future tax is not a retroactive 
application of a statute even though it is necessary to 
use a valuation base which precedes redevelopment ac-
tivity. 
For the foregoing reasons we urge that the deci-
sion of the trial court, the validity of the Utah Neigh-
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borhood Development Act and the legality of the 
proposed issue of parking revenue and tax allocation 
bonds be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX 
Richard S. Fox 
William D.Oswald 
Attorneys for Defendmts-
Bespondents 
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